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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. NATURE OF THE CASE

This matter arises from a workers' compensation claim in which Plaintiff-Respondent
(hereinafter "Respondent") alleges he sustained an industrial accident and injury on December
18, 2009, arising out of and in the course of his employment with Defendant-Appellant United
Parcel Service (hereinafter "UPS"). Specifically, Respondent alleges he injured his back when
he bent over to tie his shoelace. The main focus of the case is whether Respondent's injury was
the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as defined by Idaho
Workers' Compensation Law.
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
In May 2010, Respondent filed a Request for Calendaring.

Among the issues he

requested be decided was his entitlement to permanent partial impairment (PPI) and permanent
partial disability (PPD).

UPS filed a response along with a motion to bifurcate the issues

because Respondent had not yet been certified at maximum medical improvement (MMI), and
thus the issues of PPI and PPD were not yet ripe. In the alternative, UPS requested a hearing on
all the issues be scheduled after November 2010 to allow time for additional preparation.
Following a telephone conference between the parties and the assigned Referee, the Commission
bifurcated the issues and scheduled a hearing for September 28, 20 l 0. The issues listed in the
Notice of Hearing to be decided were:
1. Whether Respondent suffered a personal mJury ansmg out of and in the
course of employment;
2. Whether Respondent's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and
in the course of employment;
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3. Whether Respondent was entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof;
4. Whether Respondent was entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total
disability (TPD/TTD) benefits and the extent thereof; and
5. Whether Respondent was entitled to attorney fees due to UPS's unreasonable
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804.
Following the hearing, the parties submitted post-hearing briefs. In Respondent's posthearing brief, he requested a sum-certain amount for past medical benefits so that he could obtain
an enforceable judgment pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-735 and upon which interest could be
calculated. The Industrial Commission issued its first Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order (hereinafter "2011 Decision") on May 17, 2011. The issues listed in the 2011 Decision as
to be decided were slightly modified from those listed in the Notice of Hearing. They were
identified as:
1. Whether Respondent suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment;
2. Whether Respondent was entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits
and the extent thereof;
3. Whether Respondent was entitled to medical benefits and the extent thereof;
and
4. Whether Respondent was entitled to an award of attorney fees.
The Industrial Commission held that Respondent's injury occurred on UPS's premises
for purpose of the premises presumption, but that UPS effectively rebutted the presumption. It
asserted there was no dispute Respondent sustained an accident and injury as defined in fdaho
Code § 72-102(18)(a)(b) and (c), leaving it to consider whether Respondent met his burden of
proving the occurrence of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. This
assertion will be discussed more fully below in Section l(a) of the Argument Section.
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The Industrial Commission held that the risk of injury from Respondent's employment
with UPS was equal to his risk apart from it; however, Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc. made it clear
that in such cases, the iajury is deemed to arise out of employment.

To the extent the

longstanding rule explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County was to the contrary, the Industrial
Commission asserted it was overruled by Spivey. It held that Respondent satisfied his burden of
proving the occurrence of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and
ordered UPS to pay medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68 and time loss benefits from
December 8, 2009, through December 6, 2010, the date it found Respondent was deemed
medically stable. It declined to award Respondent attorney fees because there was no bright line
in Idaho case law regarding when an accident is said to arise out of and in the course of
employment, and there were no eases directly on point to the facts in this ease. The Industrial
Commission further stated that "more importantly," the scope and reach of the Supreme Court's
decision in Spivey is a subject of legitimate debate.

The decision stated it was final and

conclusive as to all matters adjudicated pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718.
UPS filed a Notice of Appeal with the Supreme Court pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l (d) because
the Commission did not expressly retain jurisdiction and the Order stated it was final as to all
matters adjudicated. The Supreme Court dismissed UPS's appeal, and UPS filed a Motion for
Clarification requesting the Court to clarify the grounds on which it based the dismissal,
particularly regarding whether the Industrial Commission's 2011 Decision was a final decision
for purposes of an appeal. The Supreme Court denied UPS's motion and referred it to Jensen v.
Pillsbury Co., 121Idaho127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992).
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Litigation continued, and UPS filed a Notice of Complaint against the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund ("ISIF"). Prior to the second hearing, UPS requested several additional issues to
be heard, including whether the Industrial Commission's 2011 Decision triggered its payment
obligations in spite of the Supreme Court's ruling which implied it was not a final decision for
purposes of an appeal as a matter of right. If UPS was obligated to pay the award prior to such
an appeal, it requested that the Industrial Commission determine whether it would be entitled to
reimbursement in the event the Supreme Court reversed the 2011 Decision. Respondent opposed
adding the reimbursement issue, and a telephone conference took place on the matter between
the parties and the Commissioners.

Both parties submitted briefs on the issue, with UPS

requesting a stay of the 2011 Decision, and Respondent asserting UPS had waived its right to
appeal the case to the Idaho Supreme Court under I.A.R. 11 (d).
In December 2011, the Industrial Commission denied the stay and ordered UPS to pay
the award granted by the 2011 Decision with appropriate interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 72734. It asserted the parties' right to appeal the case to the Idaho Supreme Court under I.A.R.
11 (d) had not vested, and the time to file an appeal would not start to run until the issues pending
before the Commission had been adjudicated. It held Respondent was not entitled to attorney
fees because UPS had not unreasonably delayed payment of benefits and made compelling
arguments regarding why the 2011 Decision should be stayed. It further stated:
[U]nder the plain language of (Idaho Code § 72-718], the May 17, 2011 decision
is final as to the matters of whether [Respondent] suffered an injury arising out of
employment, whether [Respondent] is entitled to TTD benefits, whether
[Respondent] is entitled to medical benefits, and whether [Respondent] is entitled
not be revisited
Commission in
to attorney fees.
issues
decisions, absent instruction by the Court following an appeal. Though the
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Commission has continuing jurisdiction over the remaining issues in the case,
the May 17 decision was not intended to be, nor should it be read as,
preliminary. It is final.

(R., Vol. II, p. 208) (emphasis added). UPS timely filed a motion for permission to appeal the
Order Denying Stay, and the Industrial Commission granted pennission, stating:
There appears to be a conflict between Idaho Code § 72-718 and I.A.R. 11 (d) as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823
P.2d 161 (1992). We believe that the parties and the Commission would benefit
from the Court's examination of the relationship between I.A. R. 11 (d) and
Section 72-718. Reconciliation of these provisions could have a substantial
impact not only on this case, but on many cases before the Commission and,
indeed, on Commission procedure itself If bifurcated orders are not final orders
for purposes of enforcement and appeal, the Commission would need to consider
whether it should continue to allow the practice of bifurcation.
(R., Vol. II, pp. 226-39).

On January 30, 2012, the Supreme Court denied the motion and

ordered the remaining issues be litigated without further delay. Following the Court's order,
UPS issued Respondent a check for $184, 172.3 8, the amount awarded in the 2011 Decision for
medical and TTD benefits plus interest.
In a February 2012 phone conference, UPS raised the issue of res judicata and collateral
estoppel as it pertained to medical benefits and attorney fees, which were litigated at the first
hearing.

In response, Respondent filed a request to include the res judicata and collateral

estoppcl issue in the notice of hearing. Respondent alleged he was entitled to additional medical
benefits incurred both before and aner the first hearing. He also asserted he was entitled to
attorney fees for UPS' s unreasonable delay in paying benefits.

UPS asserted the issues of

attorney fees and extent of Respondent's entitlement to medical benefits were precluded under
res judicata or collateral estoppel because they were previously litigated at the first hearing. On
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March 7, 2012, the Industrial Commission issued a Notice of Hearing and identified the issues to
be litigated at the upcoming hearing as:
1. Whether and to what extent Respondent was entitled to PPI, PPD, and
mileage, per diem, and lodging expenses related to his industrial injury;
2. Whether Respondent was totally and permanently disabled under the 100%
method or odd-lot doctrine;
3. Whether apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 was appropriate;
4. Whether ISIF was liable under Idaho Code § 72-332, and if so, apportionment
under the Carey formula;
5. Whether UPS was entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid pursuant to the
Industrial Commission's 2011 Decision should it be reversed on appeal;
6. Whether Respondent was entitled to past-denied medical benefits or whether
the issue of such benefits was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata;
7. Whether Respondent was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §
72-804 or whether the issue was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata;
8. Whether UPS was liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of all past-denied
medical bills incurred in connection with Respondent's industrial injury; and
9. Whether the Industrial Commission, in order to prevent a manifest injustice,
should amend its 2011 Decision to reflect that UPS was liable for 100% of the
invoiced amount of all past-denied medical bills in connection with
Respondent's industrial injury.
(R., Vol. II, pp. 258-59). With respect to issues 6 and 7, the Industrial Commission considered
the doctrine of res judicata inclusive of collateral estoppel. The second hearing took place on
May 17, 2012.
The Industrial Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
(hereinafter "2012 Decision") on September 28, 2012. It determined Respondent was totally and
permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine and prior to the subject injury had pre-existing
physical impainnent of 9% whole person for his right thumb, 7% whole person for his low back,
7% whole person for his left shoulder, and 10% whole person for his right shoulder.

For

purposes of ISIF liability, the Industrial Commission found that Respondent's pre-existing low
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back condition was the only pre-existing condition to combine with his 2009 injury and cause his
total and permanent disability. It asserted, however, that the doctrine of quasi-estoppcl applied
because UPS and its current surety, Liberty Insurance Corporation, were now asserting a position
inconsistent with a position UPS and its surety in 1990, Liberty Northwest Insurance,
"acquiesced in and benefitted from" in 1991 regarding Respondent's low back condition. (R.,
Vol. II, p. 303). Respondent sustained a prior low back injury in 1990 while working for UPS
and was eventually released back to work in 1991 without impairment or restrictions.

The

Industrial Commission held that because UPS was now asserting Respondent's 1990 low back
injury warranted a 7% impairment rating, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bound UPS and its
current surety to the 0% rating from 1991. Therefore, ISIF was not liable for any portion of
Respondent's total and permanent disability, and UPS was wholly liable.
The Industrial Commission further held that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar
Respondent's claim for medical expenses incurred prior to the first hearing because each medical
bill represented a distinct claim for a benefit payable. Because these bills were not actually
litigated at the first hearing, and because UPS did not otherwise dispute them in its 2012 Brief,
the Industrial Commission ordered Respondent was entitled to reimbursement. It also awarded
Respondent attorney fees because once the Supreme Court denied UPS's request for pem1issive
appeal, it believed UPS unreasonably contested Respondent's demand for certain medical and
related expenses incurred after the first hearing, as well as Respondent's PPI award given by
Tyler Frizzell, M.D., after the first hearing.
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UPS timely moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Industrial Commission's
application of quasi-estoppel was in error because the doctrine was not affirmatively pleaded, not
set forth in the Notice of Hearing, not proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and because
UPS's surety in 1990 was different than in the instant matter. UPS also argued it was in error for
the Industrial Commission not to apply the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel to
medical benefits Respondent incurred prior to the first hearing and the issue of attorney fees
because both issues were litigated at the first hearing, and the Industrial Commission expressly
stated in its 2011 Order Denying Stay that it would not revisit the issues absent instruction by the
Supreme Court following an appeal.
On December 5, 2012, the Industrial Commission issued an Errata correcting certain
typographical and factual errors in its 2012 Decision. On December 10, 2012, it issued its Order
on Reconsideration, amending its 2012 Decision to reflect that paragraphs 5, 7, and 8 stated:
5. UPS was liable for payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of all medical
bills referenced in the 2012 Decision which were incurred by Respondent in
connection with the subject accident prior to the 2011 Decision, with credit
for amounts previously paid, and with respect to certain expenses, Respondent
was not entitled to recover payment for those services rendered from the date
of the accident through September 27, 2010 (the day prior to the first
hearing);
7. UPS was liable for certain mileage, per diem, and lodging expenses, but not
those incurred from the date of the subject accident through September 27,
2010; and
8. Respondent was entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72804 for UPS's unreasonable denial of PPI benefits after January 30, 2012 (the
date the Supreme Court issued its Order Denying Permissive Appeal).
On January 18, 2013, UPS timely filed its Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Comi
pursuant to I.AR. 1 l(d) asserting points oflegal enor in the Industrial Commission's 201 land
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2012 decisions.
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent began working at UPS as a delivery driver in 1983. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 6
at 15). His job duties included loading a truck with packages, driving to various locations within
his designated region, and delivering packages. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 17 at 16-19). Throughout
his employment, Respondent worked out of McCall or Cascade, Idaho. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 6
at 17). For the past twelve years of his employment, he worked primarily out of Cascade. (2010
Hearing Tr., p. 24 at 8). When making deliveries from that location, Respondent was considered
a "satellite driver" because he did not operate out of a designated UPS center. (2010 Hearing
Tr., pp. 52 at 12-17, 88 at 13-22). Instead, each morning he drove from his home to the Cascade
airport in his personal vehicle, loaded his UPS truck with packages, and called in his hours to a
UPS clerk in McCall. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 26 at 7-20). After completing his deliveries for the
day, Respondent would park his UPS truck back in the general airport parking lot and leave his
DIAD (an electronic device) inside the airport. (2010 Hearing Tr., pp. 26 at 19-20, 27 at 17-18).
Respondent was able to use the airport facilities for work because he knew several
members of the Arnold family (who owned the business that leased the space) for more than
thirty years. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 62 at 19-21). Given this, he secured a key to the building and
was allowed to keep some of his supplies in the common area, use the restrooms, and spend time
in the lounge. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 74 at 15-18). Only one other UPS employee, the feeder
driver, was allowed to have a key to the building in order to put Respondent's DIAD inside.
(2010 Hearing Tr., p. 79 at 9-12).
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UPS did not have a separate or designated area within the airport and there was not a
written lease agreement allowing its employees to use or access the building. (2010 Hearing Tr.,
pp. 75 at 1-8, 90 at 18-20, 91 at 3-5). UPS did not own or control the airport facilities, did not
pay to use the space, nor did it maintain the premises or make repairs. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 91
at 14-16). Although Arnold Aviation owned the building and ran the airport, the city of Cascade
actually owned the land. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 78 at 21-25). When the parking lot was plowed
in the winter, Arnold Aviation moved the UPS package trailer, not UPS. (2010 Hearing Tr., p.
76 at 6-8). Though UPS subsequently approved the arrangement with Arnold Aviation, it did not
exercise control over the premises, manage the grounds, or have any power over how the airport
operated. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 91 at 14-16).
In 2009, UPS had multiple policies intended to prevent and minimize injuries. Included
in these policies was the requirement that package drivers wear sturdy work shoes. (App. Ex. 7,
p. I 3 at 16-17). Although Respondent testified in his deposition and at hearing that he believed
there was a requirement his work shoes lace-up, there has not been such a requirement during his
employment with UPS. (App. Ex. 7, pp. 16 at 11-16, 25). UPS required its drivers to wear
sturdy work shoes with leather uppers and slip-resistant soles. (App. Ex. 6, p. 85). Holes, tears,
or loose or hanging parts were not permitted. (App. Ex. 6, p. 85). Workers were required to
show up to work suited up, with their shoelaces tied and prepared for the day. (App. Ex. 7, pp.
3 7 at 1 I -19, 23 0-3 1).
Michael McGuire, Health and Safety Manager at UPS for the Northwest District, was
responsible for Occupational Safety and Health Administration compliance, and administering
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the company's safety training programs. (App. Ex. 7, p. 6 at 24-25). He has been with UPS
since 1985 and worked as a pre-loader, package driver, on-car supervisor, and business
manager. (App. Ex. 7, pp. 7-9). He testified that the most common injury at UPS was from
lifting or lowering, with slip and falls being the second most common. (App. Ex. 7, pp. 2425). He was not aware of a single injury at UPS from an untied shoelace or other shoelacerelated mishap. (App. Ex. 7, p. 144).
The boots Respondent wore at the time of his 2009 injury were not compliant with UPS
footwear policies because they were rubber and lacked a sturdy leather upper. (2010 Hearing
Tr., p. 87 at 3-15). Drivers were instructed not to wear these types of boots because they did not
protect against impact injuries from falling objects as well as leather. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 87 at
3-15). Drivers were encouraged to wear wool socks to help keep their feet wam1 and free from
moisture. (2010 Hearing Tr., pp. 87 at 9-25, 88 at 1-7). UPS did not provide its drivers with
footwear or reimburse them for shoe purchases. (App. Ex. 7, p. 135 at 1-16). It did not train its
employees regarding shoe tying posture or techniques, and did not have written policies
regarding shoe tying. (App. Ex. 7, pp. 25-26). It did not require Respondent to dress for work at
the satellite facility, and Respondent did not keep his shoes there when he was not working.
(App. Ex. 7, pp. 26 at 1-8, 37 at 11-19, 51 at 4-12, 55-56). At the first hearing, Respondent
testified that keeping his shoes tied was important generally and not just for his job. (2010
Hearing Tr., p. 59 at 13-20).
On Friday December 18, 2009, Respondent arrived at the Cascade airport at 6:20 am and
started his UPS truck. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 27 at 21). He intentionally left his shoes untied
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when he left his house that morning with the plan he would tie them once he began his shift.
(2010 Hearing Tr., pp. 61 at 19-25, 62 at 1-6). He wore lace-up boots that he used for all
outdoor activities in the winter, not just for work. (2010 Hearing Tr., pp. 60 at 16, 61at21-23).
After going inside the airport lobby to sit down on a couch and wait for his truck to warm up,
Respondent bent over to tie his boots and felt a pop in his back. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 28 at 1825). He then stood up and went to where he could put his feet up on a ladder and tie his boots
without bending over. (2010 Hearing Tr., pp. 28 at 24-25, 29 at 1-2). After tying both boots, he
got his DIAD and drove his UPS truck over to the trailer to begin loading it with packages.
(20 l 0 Hearing Tr., p. 29 at 2-8).

Around the same time, a coworker from the McCall office

called to ask if he needed help with the loading. (2010 :Hearing Tr., p. 29 at 10-15). Respondent
proceeded to load the truck himself for an hour and a half before a coworker came to help with
the remaining packages.

(2010 Hearing Tr., p. 16-22).

Respondent made his scheduled

deliveries and completed his shift as nonnal. He worked his subsequent shifts that week at his
regular duties. (App. Ex. 3, p. 53 at 7-9).
On January 24, 2010, Respondent rep01ied to his supervisor he had injured his back at
work. (App. Ex. 3, p. 53 at 16-21). On January 28, 2010, ten days after his injury occurred,
Respondent sought medical care from Scott Harris, M.D. (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 32 at 17-20).
Dr. Harris referred him to Dr. Frizzell, who performed an L4-5 laminectomy and discectomy on
January 20, 2010, and a lumbar fusion six months later. (2010 Hearing Tr., pp. 34 at 14-15, 36 at
1, 40 at 20). Dr. Frizzell certified Respondent at MMI in late November 20 l 0 and subsequently
assigned permanent physical restrictions. (R., Vol. III, p. 402). He awarded Respondent a 19%
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PPI rating and apportioned 7% to Respondent's pre-existing lumbar condition. (R., Vol. III, pp.
407-08).

Both Drs. Harris and Frizzell opined that although Respondent had pre-existing

symptoms and degeneration in his low back prior to December 18, 2009, bending over to tie his
shoelace caused an acute injury. (Resp. 2010 Ex. 2, pp. 002003, 003040-003041).
Dr. Frizzell is the only physician to assign a permanent impairment rating in relation to
Respondent's 2009 low back injury. (R., Vol. III, pp. 407-08). Both parties sought clarification
from him regarding the calculation of his rating and whether it should be apportioned for
Respondent's pre-existing lumbar condition. (App. Ex. 20). Dr. Frizzell evaluated both parties'
contentions and maintained his opinion that Respondent had a 19% whole person impairment
rating related to his back, with 7% attributable to his pre-existing low back condition stemming
from his 1990 industrial injury. Claimant had a non-operative disc herniation at L4-5, the same
level involved in his 2009 injury. (App. Ex. 20, pp. 227, 230; Frizzell Depo., p. 14 at 8-14).
Following medical stability, UPS worked with Respondent to identify a position within
Dr. Frizzell's restrictions, but was unable to find one that was suitable. (R., Vol. III, p. 402).
Respondent resigned from UPS in order to access his 401K and applied for Social Security
disability benefits. (R., Vol. III, p. 402). He was awarded Social Security disability benefits
retroactive to December 24, 2009. (R., Vol. III, p. 402). At the time of the second hearing,
Respondent was receiving at least $2,260.00 per month in Social Security benefits and $2, l 08.00
in pension funds.

(R., Vol. III, p. 402). His Social Security disability income restricted his

outside monthly earnings to around $920 per month before his disability benefits were affected.
(R., Vol. III, p. 403). His pension income also placed restrictions on his monthly employment
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earnings. (R., Vol. III, p. 403).
Respondent has a significant history of low back problems prior to his 2009 injury. He
filed sixteen prior workers' compensation claims in Idaho, including four low back injuries.
(App. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2). He was diagnosed with chronic low back pain and current upper back pain
less than five months before his 2009 injury. (App. Ex. 5, p. 76). In 1990, while UPS was
insured with Liberty Northwest Insurance, a related but dif1erent surety than in the instant matter,
Respondent sustained a low back injury at L4-5, the same level involved in his 2009 injury. (R.,
Vol. III, p. 405). He was considered a candidate for a discectomy at that level, but did not
undergo the procedure and was declared medically stable on or about April 2, 1991. (R., Vol.
III, p. 405).

Richard Knoebel, M.D., evaluated Respondent at that time and opined he was

capable of returning to work without restriction or permanent physical impairment. (R., Vol. III,
p. 405). There is no evidence in the record Respondent requested a second opinion or contested
the rating, and he did not file a Complaint. Respondent missed approximately 22 weeks of work
as a result of the 1990 injury for which he received time loss benefits. (R., Vol. III, p. 405).
In September 1999, Respondent sustained another low back injury at work when he
slipped while carrying a package.

(R., Vol. III, pp. 405-06).

An MRI showed mild canal

stenosis at L4-5 due to a broad diffuse disc bulge and mild bilateral facet osteoarthritis. (R., Vol.
III, p. 406). Respondent missed approximately 4 weeks of work as a result of the injury for
which he received time loss benefits.

(R., Vol. III, p. 406).

No physical restrictions or

permanent impairment were assigned. (R., Vol. III, p. 406). Although Respondent testified that
none of his prior injuries impacted his ability to engage in gainful activity, including the injuries
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to his low back, the Industrial Commission determined there was significant evidence
contradicting his testimony, and that Respondent's low back symptoms prior to his 2009
industrial injury were severe enough to cause him to modify the manner in which he performed
his work. (R., Vol. III, pp. 407 at 23-24, 409 at 30, 410 at 31-32).
4. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in
determining Respondent suffered an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment causing an injury on December 18, 2009.
2. Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in
determining UPS is estopped from asserting any position on Respondent's
pre-existing physical impairment inconsistent with the 0% PPI rating assessed
by Richard Knoebel, M.D., in 1991.
3. Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining Respondent is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804.
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
Whether the Industrial Commission correctly applied the law to the facts is an issue of
law over which the Supreme Court exercises free review. Combes v. State Indus. Special lndem.
Fund, 130 Idaho 430, 431, 942 P.2d 554, 556 (1997).

The Industrial Commission's factual

findings will not be disturbed on appeal so long as they arc supported by substantial and
competent evidence. J.C. § 72-732; Neihart v. Universal Joint Auto Parts, Inc., 141 Idaho 801,
803, 118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less
than a preponderance. Page v. McCain Food<;, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 344, 109 P.3d 1084, 1086
(2005). It is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the Supreme Court exercises free
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review. Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 51, 57, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (2011) (citing
Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d
632, 634 (2006)).
ARGUMENT

1.

THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
DETERMINING RESPONDENT SUFFERED AN ACCDIENT ARISING OUT OF
AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT CAUSING AN INJURY ON
DECEMBER 18, 2009.
a. The Industrial Commission erroneously determined UPS did not dispute
Respondent suffered an accident and injury as those terms are defined in
Idaho Code § 72-102(18).
From the outset, the primary issue in this case has been whether Respondent suffered an

accident and injury as those terms are defined in Idaho Code § 72-102(18) when he bent over to
tie his shoelace.

Under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law, a claimant has the burden of

proving to a reasonable degree of medical probability that his or her iajury was caused by an
industrial accident. Gooby v. Lake Shore Mgmt. Co., 136 Idaho 79, 85, 29 P.3d 390, 396 (2001).
"Probable" is defined as "having more evidence for than against." Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96
Idaho 341, 344, 528 P .2d 903, 906 (197 4 ). The statutory definitions of "accident" and "iajury"
have distinct, but related meanings.
(a) "Injury" means a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in
the course of any employment covered by the worker's compensation law.
(b) "Accident" means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or
untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be
reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury.
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(c) "Irtjury" and "personal injury" shall be construed to include only an injury
caused by an accident, which results in violence to the physical structure of the
body. The terms shall in no case be construed to include an occupational disease
and only such nonoccupational diseases as result directly from an injury.
I.C. § 72-102(18). Accordingly, the test for determining compensability is multi-pronged, and a
claimant must satisfy all the elements to be entitled to compensation. Kessler v. Payette County,
129 Idaho 855, 859, 934 P.2d 28, 32 (1997).
In this case, the Industrial Commission erred by asserting UPS did not dispute an
accident or injury as defined in Idaho Code § 72-102(18) had occurred.

UPS denied the

occurrence of an accident in its initial pleadings and has not wavered from that position. As is
evident from the 2010 Notice of Hearing, the occurrence of an accident and injury arising out of
and in the course of Respondent's employment was in dispute and the primary issue of
contention between the pmiies. Nonetheless, in the 2011 Decision, the issues "to be decided as a
result of the hearing" included only an injury arising out of Respondent's employment. Implicit
in the Industrial Commission's statement is that UPS conceded the occurrence of an accident,
which is erroneous.

Nowhere in the decision does the Industrial Commission support its

statement UPS conceded the matter.

Given that the issues in the 2010 Notice of Hearing

included the occurrence of both an accident and an injury, the issues were naturally in dispute,
and the Industrial Commission cited no evidence to the contrary in support of its assertion.
Although UPS conceded Respondent had "arrived at his satellite location and was preparing to
begin his day," this only relates to the "in the course of' prong of the compensability test and
was not a concession that an accident arising out of Respondent's employment occurred. (App.
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2010 Brief, p. 19).
Moreover, the Industrial Commission subsequently asserted that UPS had also conceded
the occurrence of an injury as defined by Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law:
There is no dispute that [Respondent] suffered an accident and injury on
December 18, 2009, as those terms are defined in Idaho Code§§ 72-102(18)(a)(b)
and (c), and that the accident causing the injury occurred during the course of
[Respondent's] employment. The question is whether his accident and injury
arose out of his employment.
(R., Vol. I, p. 35). The Industrial Commission's assertion misconstrues UPS's position on these
matters and is not supported by the record. It also directly contradicts the plain language of the
statute, which requires a compensable injury be "caused by an accident arising out of and in the
course of any employment .... " I.C. § 72-102(18)(a). The terms "accident" and "injury" are
not synonymous. Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858, 866 n.3, 712 P.2d 559, 567 n.3
(1985). Elimination of the accident requirement would transform workers' compensation into
health insurance.
(2004).

Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477, 479, 95 P.3d 628, 630

Further, if the Industrial Commission believed UPS had conceded both issues, it

eliminated Respondent's burden of proving his case.
The record demonstrates that UPS strongly disputed Respondent had sustained an injury
caused by an accident arising out of his employment. UPS' s 2010 Brief contained a section
titled "[Respondent] failed to prove his injury was the result

an accident arising out of his

employment" with eight pages discussing the issue. (App. 2010 Brief, pp. 12-20). At the 2010
hearing, the pariies discussed the issues listed in the Notice of Hearing and agreed they correctly
reflected the issues in dispute.
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REFEREE POWERS: And we are here to discuss some issues including - and
I'm just going to go off the notice of hearing here, counsel. We may have
modified these somewhat during the course of these proceedings and, if so, let me
know. But the first listed issue is whether or not [Respondent] suffered a personal
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Obviously, still,
probably, a major issue in the ease. The second listed issue is whether or not
[Respondent's] injury was a result of an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment. About the same thing. And medical care, TTD, TPD's, and
attorney fees. Are those the issues?
MR. KALLAS: Yes, Your [sic] Honor.
REFEREE: Mrs. Veltman?
MRS. VELTMAN: [UPS] agrees.
(2010 Hearing Tr., pp. 4 at 17-25, 5 at 1-2) (emphasis added). For the Industrial Commission to
find otherwise and assert UPS conceded both issues is erroneous and not supported by the
record.
b. To the extent Spivey expands the positional risk doctrine beyond neutral risk cases, it is
not binding precedent because it conflicts with prior Supreme Court decisions and the
plain language of Idaho Code § 72-102(18).
The Supreme Court's holding in Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc. extended Idaho's use of the
positional risk doctrine past the limitations established by prior case law, and broadened the
scope of compensability beyond what the legislature intended. Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 13 7
Idaho 29, 34-35, 43 P.3d 788, 793-94 (2002).

Under the positional risk doctrine, "An injury

arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and
obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he or she was injured." 1
K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation § 3.05 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.). Usually,
courts only apply the doctrine in very specific situations where the risk of injury is deemed
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neutral.

Id.

Such cases typically involve stray bullets, unexplained assaults, and other

circumstances where the risk of injury is neither personal nor employment related. Id. A court
may adopt a positional risk theory without expressly referencing the doctrine. Id.
The Supreme Court has historically relied on the explanation in Eriksen v. Nez Perce
County regarding what it means for an injury to arise out of and in the course of employment
under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law. Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 6, 235
P.2d 736, 738-39 (1951). There, the Court stated:
It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of the employment
when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to
perform. It arises 'out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person
familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the
nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of the employment. But it excludes
an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen
would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative
danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It
must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the
relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but
after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with
the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational
consequence.
Id. (citing Larsen v. State Indus. Accident Comm 'n, 135 Or. 137, 140, 295 P. 195, 196
(1931)) (emphasis added). This description has been relied on since the Court decided Eriksen
and referenced by subsequent Supreme Court cases in one form or another. See Jensen v. City of
Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 211, 217 (2000); Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc.,
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133 Idaho 572, 990 P.2d 738 (1999); Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 860, 934 P.2d
28, 33 (1997); Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 477, 849 P.2d 934, 938 (1993); ()'Loughlin
v. Circle A Const., 112 Idaho 1048, 1051, 739 P.2d 347, 350 (1987); Cahala v. OK Tire Store,
112 Idaho 1020, 1022, 739 P.2d 319, 321 (1987). It is typically referred to as the greater or
increased-risk test, which is the prevalent test of compensability in the United States today.
Larson, supra at§ 3.03.
Before Spivey, the Supreme Court limited the positional risk doctrine to only neutral risk
cases. Mayo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 163, 457 P.2d 400, 402 (1969). In Mayo, a
grocery store manager was killed by a coworker, but no personal or work-related reason for the
killing could be determined.

Id. at 161-62, 400-01.

In finding the death compensable, the

Supreme Court discussed Idaho's adoption of the positional risk doctrine in cases where a death
or injury resulted from a completely unexplained assault on the employer's premises. Id at 163,
402.

It stated that the doctrine was solidified by its eariier decisions in Louie v. Bamboo

Gardens and Foust v. Birds Eye Div. of General Foods Corp.; cases which made "clear that
Idaho has adopted the positional risk rule under which when a death or injury resulting from a
completely unexplained assault occurs on the employer's premises, and in the course of
employment, a rebuttable presumption arises that the injury arose out of the employment and is
compensable."

Id. (citing Louie v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947) and

Foust v. Birds Eye Div. a/General Foods Corp., 91Idaho418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967)). According
to the Court:
The rationale for this rule is that when the cause of the injury can be attributed to
neither an occupational nor personal origin, and is thus neutral, there is no more
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reason to assign the resulting loss to the employee than to the employer. Under
such circumstances the scales are evenly balanced, and all that is needed to tip
them in favor of compensability under the positional risk doctrine is that the
employment brought the employee to the place of injury.
Id. at 164, 403.

Citing Larson's Workers' Compensation treatise, the Court explained that assault cases
are divided into three classifications.
First there are those assaults which are inherently related to the employment, such
as assaults arising out of work disputes, and which generally result in award of
compensation. Second, there are those assaults which are inherently personal or
private in origin, which assaults arise from disputes imported by the employee
from outside the sphere of employment, the only connection with the employment
being the location at which the assault occurs. This class of assaults is generally
considered as being noncompensable. The third classification by Larson is the
'neutral' assaults, wherein the cause of the assault can neither be assigned to the
employment nor to the personal disputes with the employee. Neutral assaults
include assaults by lunatics and completely unexplained assaults.
Id. at 163, 402.

The Court noted, however, that the positional risk test was not the exclusive test of
compensability.

Id. at 164, 403.

It specifically overruled its decision in Wells v. Robinson

Constr. Co., where an employee was struck and killed by lightning while operating a plow,

because it was a clear neutral risk case. Id. at 164-65, 403-04 (discussing Wells v. Robinson
Constr. Co., 52 Idaho 562, 16 P.2d 1059 (1932)). The Court explained:

Lightning is obviously a neutral cause of injury equally unconnected with either
the employer or the employee personally, and consequently the fact that it was the
employment which placed the employee in the place where he received the injury
would justify compensation.
Id
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The Court also stated that although Foust was not a neutral risk case, there was a
rebuttable presumption the injury arose out of and in the course of employment because the
injury occurred on the employer's premises. Id. at 163, 402. Foust involved a worker who was
injured after her shift in the company parking lot when a coworker backed into her with his car.
Foust, 91 Idaho at 418, 422 P.2d at 616.

The employer maintained the parking lot for its

employees and no public transportation serviced the site. Id. At first blush, it would appear the
Court in Mayo intended the positional risk doctrine to apply to all workers' compensation cases,
regardless of whether the risk of injury was neutral; however, the presumption set forth in Foust
simply describes Idaho's recognition of the premises presumption, which provides that when an
injury occurs on an employer's premises, there is a rebuttable presumption it arose out of and in
the course of employment. Id. at 419, 617. Similar to the positional risk doctrine, the premises
presumption is not the exclusive test of compensability, but one factor to be considered. Mayo,
93 Idaho at 164, 457 P.2d at 403; In re Malmquist, 78 Idaho 117, 121, 300 P.2d 820, 822-23
(1956); See Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859-60, 934 P.2d 28, 32-33 (1997).
Case law following i\!layo demonstrates the Supreme Court did not intend the positional
risk doctrine to apply to all injuries that occur at work. See Cahala v. OK Tire Store, 112 Idaho
l 020, 739 P.2d 319 (1987). Aside from Foust, each of the cases cited in Mayo in support of the
positional risk doctrine concerns an unexplained assault. 1\!fayo, 93 Idaho at 164, 457 P.2d at
403.

Moreover, in Cahala v. OK Tire Store, which involved an assault on the employer's

premises, the Supreme Court noted that Mayo "is the controlling law in Idaho where an
employee's injury was the result of an altercation at the workplace." Cahala, 112 Idaho at l 021,
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739 P.2d at 320.
Indeed, following

~Mayo,

the Supreme Court continued to follow the rule set forth in

Eriksen that an injury does not arise out employment when it comes from a hazard the worker
would have been equally exposed to outside of employment.

See, e.g., Jensen v. City of

Pocatello, 135 Idaho at 412, 18 P.3d at 217; Dinius, 133 Idaho at 576, 990 P.2d at 742; Kessler,
129 Idaho at 860, 934 P.2d at 33; Evans, 123 Idaho at 477, 849 P.2d at 938; O'Loughlin, 112
Idaho at 1051, 739 P.2d at 350; Cahala, 112 Idaho at 1022, 739 P.2d at 321. This was the case
in Evans, where the Supreme Court upheld the Industrial Commission's rejection of the
positional risk doctrine and cited Eriksen in support of its holding. Evans, 123 Idaho at 480, 849
P .2d at 941. The claimant suffered a serious head injury after falling at work and was unable to
speak or recall how his injury occurred. Id. at 475, 936. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-228, this
created a rebuttable presumption his injuries arose out of employment. Id. at 481 n.2, 942 n.2;
LC. § 72-228.

The Industriai Commission determined the claimant had suffered an alcohol

withdrawal seizure and fallen onto the floor several feet from his workstation.

Id. at 478, 939.

He was found several feet from any object, there was no dangerous machinery or activity in the
area, and a post-accident investigation revealed nothing unusual about the work area or
suggestive of foul play.

Id. at 479, 940.

The claimant argued his injury was compensable

because it would not have happened the way it did or been as severe as it was had it not occurred
at his workplace.

Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 1991 IIC 0089.

He asserted that "but for" his

employment, he would not have sustained the injuries he did. Id Nonetheless, the Industrial
Commission found that although the concrete floor may have created a hazard, there was no
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greater risk from the claimant's employment than there was away from it. Id. In affirming the
Industrial Commission's decision, the Supreme Court cited the rule set forth in Eriksen that an
injury does not arise out of employment if it "cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a
contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have
been equally exposed apart from the employment." Evans, 123 Idaho at 479-80, 849 P.2d at
940-41.

Thus, even though the Court determined there was a risk from the claimant's

employment, it declined to adopt the positional risk doctrine because it was no greater a risk than
the claimant encountered apart from it.
The Supreme Court rejected a similar positional risk argument in Dinius v. Loving Care
and More, Inc., where the claimant asserted the accident that caused her injuries was occasioned

by her presence at work because had she not been on her employer's premises, she would not
have been injured. Dinius, 133 ldaho at 574-76, 990 P.2d at 740-42. The claimant was a janitor
who occasionally had a friend assist her with the garbage as she left for the night. Id. On the
night of her injury, the claimant asserted she had locked the building, secured the trash (a duty of
her job), and gone back to check the door for a second time. Id. at 575, 741. She then walked
alongside the building and in front of her truck (which was running with her friend inside), when
it suddenly moved forward and pinned her against the building. Id The Industrial Commission
held that the claimant's injuries did not occur in the course of her employment because she was
not engaged in the performance of her job when she was injured. Id at 575-76, 741-42. In
discussing whether the risk of injury was incidental to the claimant's employment, the Supreme
Court noted:
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The Commission made an express finding that the vehicle which injured [the
claimant] would not have been running except for [her friend's] presence at the
job site, which was solely for the claimant's convenience. Clearly, the
Commission agreed with the employer's argument that [the claimant] was
not subject to a special risk incident to her employment, nonvithstanding [the
claimant's] assertions that she had in no way deviated from her normal
activities at work and was only on the employer's premises for work
purposes. The Commission found that the iajuries which were the result of a
factor personal to [the claimant] were not causally related to her employment.
Id. at 576, 742 (emphasis added). The Court agreed with the Industrial Commission's finding in

this regard and further stated that the claimant had also failed to show "exposure to a hazard to
which she would not have been exposed outside her work environment." Id. It follows that after
Mayo, the positional risk doctrine had limited application and the Court continued to utilize a

greater risk analysis when determining compensability.
In Spivey, however, the Court extended the positional risk doctrine to essentially all cases
where an injury occurs on the employer's premises in the course of employment, which conflicts
with prior case law and the plain language ofidaho Code § 72-102(18). Spivey v. Novartis Seed
Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002). There, the claimant worked eight hours per day as a

seed sorter and sustained an injury to her shoulder when she removed a bad seed from a
conveyer belt. Id. at 31, 790. The Industrial Commission found her injury was caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of her employment based in part on medical testimony
that her employment caused or at least aggravated her pre-existing shoulder condition. Id. at 32,
791. The employer asserted the claimant's muscle mass had degenerated to the point where
reaching for anything could have caused a rotator cuff tear, and that because the claimant likely
reached for many items throughout her daily routine, her employment did not increase the
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potential for an accident resulting in an injury.

Id. at 33, 792.

The employer moved for

reconsideration on the ground the Industrial Commission did not adequately explain how the
claimant's employment placed her at a greater risk for developing a rotator cuff tear than the
general public. Id. at 32, 791. The Industrial Commission declined to reconsider the employer's
"invitation to introduce risk analysis from the occupational disease legal theory into the accident
and injury legal theory." 1 Id.
On appeal, the employer asserted that unless the risk of injury at the place of employment
was greater than or unique to "other persons of the same locality," the injury did not arise out of
employment. Id. In support of its position, the employer relied on Wells v. Robinson Constr.
Co., the lightening case expressly overruled in }vfayo because it involved a neutral risk. ,Mayo,

93 Idaho at 164, 457 P.2d at 403. The Spivey Court disagreed with the employer's assertion and
reliance on Wells, and upheld the Industrial Commission's findings as well as its refusal to utilize
a greater risk analysis in industrial accident cases. Id. It stated:
In this case, the appellants suggest a return to the rationale of Wells by requiring
[the claimant] to prove that her job duties placed her at a greater risk for injury
than that encountered by the general public performing the same physical
motions. However, a greater risk analysis is no longer required of a claimant in
light of Mayo and Kessler. [The claimant] provided substantial and competent
evidence to allow the Commission to conclude that she had suffered a
compensable injury. The burden was on the appellants to present evidence that
showed the injury was personal to [the claimant].
Id. at 35, 794. Notably, the outcome of Spivey would likely have been the same under a greater-

risk test because the claimant worked as a seed sorter sorting seeds for eight hours a day.
1

An occupational disease is defined as "a disease due to the nature of an employment in which the hazards of
such disease actually exist, are characteristic ot: and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment .... "
LC. § 72- l02(22)(a)
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Contrary to the Court's assertion in Spivey, neither Mayo nor Kessler supports an
extension of the positional risk doctrine beyond neutral risk cases. As previously discussed,
Mayo expressly restricted application of the doctrine to only those cases where the risk of injury

is neutral, such as injuries caused by lightening or unexplained assaults. Mayo, 93 Idaho at 164,
457 P.2d at 403. In Kessler, the Court plainly supports a greater risk analysis because it cites to
the rule set forth in Eriksen. Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859, 934 P.2d 28, 32
(1997). There, the Court upheld the Industrial Commission's finding that the worker's death did
not occur in the course of his employment because although his death occurred on his
employer's premises, he was neither scheduled to work nor engaged in performing a duty he was
employed to perform. Id. Although this failure to satisfy the first prong of the compensability
test required a denial of benefits, the Supreme Court discussed why the worker's death also did
not arise out of his employment. Id. at 860, 33. It explained that the "arising out of' prong
examines the origin and cause of the accident, and that in order to prove the causal connection
required by Eriksen the claimant must have established a probable connection between the
circumstances leading to his death and those surrounding his employment "by demonstrating that
Kessler was shot because of exposure to a hazard to which he would not have been exposed
outside his work environment." Id. (citing O'Loughlin, 112 Idaho at 1051, 739 P.2d at 350).
Thus, Kessler adopted the greater risk analysis announced in Eriksen, and the Court's assertion
in Spivey that the case supports a contrary theory of compensability is misplaced.
The holding in Spivey is also misplaced because it directly conflicts with the plain
language of Idaho Code § 72-102(18), which provides that a worker who sustains an injury
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the

course of employment must show the accident is connected to the employment.

LC. § 72-

l 02(18)(a), (b). Where a statute is unambiguous, its plain language controls and the Supreme
Court gives effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. Williams
v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 51, 57, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (2011) (citing Idaho
Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't ofAgric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634

(2006)). If the legislature had intended such a broad scope of compensability, it would not have
included the limitation that an injury be caused by an accident arising out of employment. To
adopt the positional risk doctrine in equal risk cases means that essentially all injuries which
occur in the course of employment will be compensable because the worker would not have
encountered the risk but for the fact that he went to work. It is well-established in Idaho that the
mere presence at work is not enough. Dinius, 133 Idaho at 576, 990 P.2d at 742; Evans, 123
Idaho at 479-80, 849 P.2d at 940-41 (upholding the Industrial Commission's finding in Evans v.
Hara 's, Inc., 1991 IIC 0089 that the claimant's employment did not contribute to his injury

because the risk of such an injury at a place of employment was no greater than the risk of injury
on a similar surface away from the employer's premises). To eliminate or render provisions of
the statute void is the province of the legislature, not the Court or the Industrial Commission.
Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477, 479, 95 P.3d 628, 630 (2004).

Moreover, other jurisdictions have held that when a worker sustains an mJury from
bending over to tie a shoelace, the injury does not arise out of employment. United Parcel Serv.
<~lAmerica

v. Fetterman, 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985). In that case, a

lumbar strain when he bent over to tie his shoelace.
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Id. at 892.

driver sustained a

He was in the process of

unloading packages from his work truck when he noticed his shoelace was untied. Id. As he
bent over to tie it, he felt acute pain in his lower back. Id. At the hearing level, the deputy
commissioner denied his claim for compensation on the ground his injury did not arise out of
employment because "it could not fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate
cause and it did not follow as a natural incident of the work." Id. The commissioner determined
that bending over to tie a shoelace was not a risk of the worker's employment, but merely
coincidental with it. Id. Upon review by the Commission, however, the decision was reversed.

Id. The Commission opined that "the work environment certainly had something to do with the
manner in which the employee tied his shoe and was necessary for him to continue his work."

Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the deputy commissioner's finding
that the injury did not arise out of the worker's employment because "the act of bending over to
tie the shoe was unrelated to any hazard common to the workplace. In other words, nothing in
the work environment contributed to the injury." Id. at 893. Similar to the Idaho Supreme
Court's reasoning in Eriksen, the court explained:
An accident arises out of the employment when there is a causal connection
between the claimant's injury and the conditions under which the employer
requires the work to be performed. Under this test, an injury arises 'out of the
employment when it has followed as a natural incident of the work and has been a
result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment. Excluded is an
injury which comes from a hazard to which the employee would have been
equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be
peculiar to the work, incidental to the character of the business, and not
independent of the master-servant relationship. The event must appear to have had
its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that
source as a rational consequence.
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Id. (citing Baggett & ,o/leador Cos. v. Dillon, 219 Va. 633, 638, 248 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1978))

(citation omitted). It further stated "Every person who wears laced shoes must occasionally
perform the act of retying the laces. The situation of a loose shoelace confronting the
claimant was wholly independent of the master-servant relationship." Id. (emphasis added).

Therefore, it reversed the Commission's decision.

Id. The Virginia Supreme Court's decision

and rationale is persuasive because it relies on factors of compensability that are virtually the
same as those set forth in Eriksen, and which the Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed.
In our case, the Industrial Commission found that Respondent's risk of injury from his
employment was equal to the risk he was exposed to apart from it.
Although the risk of injury to which [Respondent] was exposed is not a 'neutral'
risk in the sense that term is used in lvfayo v. Safeway Stores, supra, it is a neutral
risk in another sense: As [UPS has] noted, the risks associated with tying one's
shoelaces are trivial. People in all walks of life, including [Respondent], are
exposed to the same risk every day, quite apart from their employment.
(2011 Decision, p. 16). However, it determined that Spivey overruled the compensability rule set
forth in Eriksen and thus Respondent's injury arose out of his employment.
In summary, we find that the risk of injury at issue in the instant matter is likely
not a neutral risk, but, instead, a risk of injury that bears a causal connection to the
work that [Respondent] was hired to perform. However, like a true 'neutral' risk,
it is a risk of injury to which [Respondent] was equally exposed apart from
his employment. Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., supra, makes it clear that injuries
resulting from both types of risks so characterized should be deemed to arise out
of the employment. To the extent that the longstanding rule explained in Eriksen
v. Nez Perce County, supra, is to the contrary, we perceive that rule is overruled
by Spivey.
(2011 Decision, pp. 18-19). As explained above, however, to the extent Spivey expanded the
positional risk doctrine beyond neutral risk cases, it is not controlling precedent. The holding in
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Spivey misconstrued binding precedent in support of its holding, conflicts with prior Supreme

Court decisions, and contradicts the plain language ofidaho Code § 72-102( 18).
Like in Evans, Respondent argues his injury is compensable because "but for" his
employment, he would not have sustained the injuries he did. He contends his injury arose out
of employment because he was required to wear shoes without loose or hanging parts. (Resp.
2010 Brief, p. 20).

Like in Evans, however, the risk of injury from Respondent tying his

shoelace was personal to him because he imported the risk by intentionally arriving at work with
his laces untied. As in all workers' compensation cases, the particular facts of this case are
extremely important. The Industrial Commission noted that "anyone whose job includes the
requirement of carrying boxes all day, frequently in a way that obscures his view of the ground
immediately in front of him, would do well to keep his shoes tied." (2011 Decision, p. 15).
These are not the facts of this case though. This case involves the risk of an injury from bending
over to tie a shoelace, and Respondent has presented insufficient evidence that such a risk arises
out of his employment.
UPS did not provide its employees with shoes or reimburse them for shoe purchases.
(App. 2010 Brief, p. 7). It did not require employees to wear lace-up shoes, and it did not require
Respondent to dress for work at the satellite location before beginning his shift. (App. 20 l 0
Brief, pp. 3-8, 16). Despite the Industrial Commission's application of the premises presumption
(which UPS effectively rebutted), there is no dispute that UPS did not own or control the facility
where Respondent

his shoes, nor did it own or control the couch he sat on.

No

instrumentality of employment furnished by UPS was involved in his injury, and there was no
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evidence presented that anything was unusual about the shape or condition of the couch.
Respondent wore his shoes for his personal outdoor activities in the winter, not just for work, and
intentionally left them untied on the morning of December 18, 2009, when he left his house for
work. (App. 2010 Brief, p. 8). There is no evidence in the record that UPS knew or condoned of
Respondent's conduct in leaving his laces untied. Therefore, like in Evans, any risk in tying his
shoelaces was one he brought to his employment, or at the most, a risk he was equally exposed to
apart from his employment. The Industrial Commission's use of the positional risk doctrine
given its findings was in error, and its 2011 Decision warrants reversal.
2.

THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
DETERMINING APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ANY POSITION
ON RESPONDENT'S PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT INCONSISTENT
WITH THE 0% PPI RATING ASSESSED BY RICHARD KNOEBEL, M.D., IN 1991.
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in election, ratification, affirmance,
acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits. KTVB. Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 281, 486 P .2d
992, 994 ( 1971 ). The principle precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party. Id.

It applies when it would be

unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he
acquiesced, or of which he accepted a benefit. Id. The requirements for proper application of
quasi-estoppel are, therefore, that the person against whom it is sought to be applied has
previously taken an inconsistent position, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the
detriment of the person seeking application of the doctrine. Id. at 282, 995. Estoppel theories
generally present mixed questions of law and fact over which the Supreme Court exercises free
review. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008); Highlands. Inc. v.
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Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 69, 936 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1997). Quasi-estoppel is an affirmative defense
and must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 13 7
Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1247 (2002).
The Supreme Court has held that silence generally cannot be relied on to support
estoppel. Id The Court of Appeals has held that "quasi-estoppel may arise when a party who
has a duty to speak fails to do so and thereby produces an advantage for himself, or a
disadvantage for someone else, which is unconscionable." Id (citing Lupis v. Peoples Mortg.
Co., 107 Idaho 489, 491, 690 P.2d 944, 946 (1984)); KTVB, Inc., 94 Idaho at 284, 486 P.2d at
997. In Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant to collect
on a debt that was not disputed as owed. Thomas, 137 Idaho at 355, 48 P.3d at 1244. The
defendant asserted the plaintiffs claim was barred by the doctrine of quasi-estoppel because he
had knowledge the debt was owed, but did not seek to collect on it for a number of years and
wrote it off on his taxes as a loss, which is inconsistent with his subsequent attempt to collect on
it. Id The plaintiff responded that his position was never inconsistent with his intent to collect
on the debt at a later time.

Id at 3 57, 124 7.

demonstrate an intention to forgive the debt. Id

Other than silence, he did not affirmatively
He further asserted that taking a bad debt

deduction on his taxes and later attempting to collect on it was simply different business
judgments made at two different times. Id The Supreme Court agreed, and stated there was no
evidence in the record of the plaintiff's inconsistent conduct other than his silence, which is
insufficient to support

application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. Id.

To this point, the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel cannot be
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applied based on conjecture about facts known or available at an earlier time. Tommerup v.
Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 7, 607 P.2d 1055, 1061 (1980). In that case, the plaintiffs filed

suit against the defendant for injuries sustained during a slip and fall outside one of its stores. Id.
at 2, 1056. Following the accident, a representative of the store contacted the injured plaintiff
and asked her to submit all medical bills incurred in relation to the accident. Id. at 3, 1057.
After several years, the store informed the plaintiffs it would no longer make payments on the
claim. Id. The plaintiffs filed suit, and a trial court ruled in favor of the defendant. Id. The
plaintiffs appealed, asserting the case fell within the parameters of quasi-estoppel. Id. at 5, 1059.
In examining the defendant's "prior position," the Supreme Court noted that the only evidence

which could be construed as a position was the store's willingness to pay for the plaintiff's
medical bills for three years.

Id. at 6, 1060.

This fact alone, however, the Court found

unpersuasive.
Whether this conduct amounted to a 'taking of a position' by respondent that it
was admitting liability, so as to support appellants' argument for application of
quasi estoppel, is doubtful. While respondent's statement that it would 'work
directly with' appellants when they were 'in a position to finalize the claim'
arguably supports appellants' contention, it is equally reasonable to construe the
statement as indicating only that respondent's 'position' was that it was willing to
seek some mutually acceptable arrangement whereby appellants' financial burden
arising from the incident could be alleviated.
Id.

The plaintiffs also asserted that because the store began to pay related medical bills
shortly after the accident, they did not file a claim right away and thus lost the opportunity to
effectively gather evidence and reconstruct the details of the accident; a disadvantage to their
claim later on. Id. at 7, 1061. The Court disagreed with this as well and stated:
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To adopt the position of appellants would require that we first assume there was
in fact more evidence to be gathered at some earlier time. That assumption made,
we are then asked to go still further and assume also that such evidence would
have been favorable to appellants and adverse to respondent. We decline to
engage in this compound conjecture; application of quasi estoppel cannot be
based on so infirm a foundation.
Id.

The Court's holding demonstrates that a party asserting quasi-estoppel cannot rely on

assumptions about facts not in evidence in support of the doctrine's application.
a. The Industrial Commission's application of guasi-estoppel was in etTor because
UPS did not have notice it was a litigated issue.
In this case, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel was not pleaded by Respondent or ISIF, not
identified as an issue in the March 7, 2012, Notice of Hearing, and not addressed at the 2012
hearing by the parties or the Industrial Commission when they discussed the issues to be
litigated. Although the Industrial Commission is not strictly bound by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 8(c) is instructive in that it requires a pa1iy asserting an affirmative defense like
estoppel to list it in a responsive pleading.
Rule 8(c ). Affirmative defenses.
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord
and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory or
comparative negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, !aches, license, payment,
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has
mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense,
the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had
been a proper designation.
I.R.C.P. 8(c) (emphasis added). In addition, The Supreme Court has held that administrative
tribunals are unable to raise issues without first serving an affected party with "fair notice" and a
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"full opportunity" to meet such issues. Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 781, 118 P .3d 111,
113 (2005) (citing White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977)).
Idaho Code§ 72-713 provides:
72-713. Notice of hearings -- Service. The commission shall give at least ten (10)
days' written notice of the time and place of hearing and of the issues to be heard,
either by personal service or by registered or certified mail.
I.C. § 72-713. The Supreme Comi has also held, however, that the Industrial Commission does
not need to specifically state each individual issue in the notice when a listed issue turns on a
threshold matter of compensability. Gomez v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 601, 272 P.3d
569, 573 (2012).

For example, the issue of a claimant's entitlement to medical benefits is

dependent on whether the injury for which the worker seeks treatment is causally related to
employment. It is therefore necessary the claimant prove causation in order to show entitlement
to such benefits. See id. (discussing Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 564-65,
130 P.3d 1097, 1102-03 (2006)).

In such a case, the Industrial Commission need not list

causation in the notice because it is an "element of the ultimate goal of entitlement" that puts the
claimant on notice of the need to prove a causal connection between the industrial accident and
the injury. Id. at 574, 602.
In this case, Respondent briefly discussed quasi-estoppel in his 2012 brief, but did not
affirmatively raise the issue in his pleadings or as a defense prior to hearing. Similarly, ISIF did
not plead the issue prior to hearing, nor did it expressly argue the doctrine in its brief. ISIF did
assert that UPS had taken a position in this matter which was inconsistent with a position it took
previously, but this alone does not effectively give rise to an estoppel defense. ISIF's brief failed
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to discuss the doctrine of estoppel, let alone quasi-estoppel in particular, and thus did not address
the necessary elements of the doctrine or how they applied in this case.

The Industrial

Commission's implicit finding that ISIF raised the doctrine in its brief is not supported by the
record. As an affirmative defense, Respondent and ISIF were required to identify the doctrine in
their pleadings or raise it as an issue prior to hearing if they sought to have it applied against
UPS, and prove each of the elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Neither was done in
this case. Contrast this to the issue of res judicata (inclusive of collateral cstoppel) as it applies
to medical-related expenses and attorney fees, which was raised by the parties prior to hearing,
set forth in the Commission's 2012 hearing notice, and specifically discussed at the outset of the
2012 hearing. (2012 Hearing Tr., pp. 5-7; Resp. Request to Include Supplemental Issue for
Resolution at 2012 Hearing dated February 13, 2012, p. 3).
The Industrial Commission does not assert that the Notice of Hearing included the issue
of quasi-estoppel or that it was discussed as an issue prior to hearing. It also does not assert that
the doctrine turns on another issue specifically listed in the notice like in Gomez. Respondent
has argued that quasi-estoppel is subsumed within ISIF liability similar to the way causation is
subsumed within the issue of a claimant's entitlement to medical benefits, and therefore, UPS
had notice of the issue. This argument is without merit because quasi-estoppel is a legal doctrine
and affirmative defense, not a necessary clement that must be proven in order to establish ISIF
liability. The Industrial Commission therefore erred when it utilized the doctrine because it was
not pleaded or raised as an issue prior to hearing. Because UPS did not have proper notice of the
issue and was not afforded the opportunity to put on evidence regarding the matter, the Industrial
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Commission's findings on the issue should be reversed.
b. The Industrial Commission's findings in support of quasi-estoppel are not
supported bv substantial and competent evidence.
To this point the Industrial Commission's conclusions regarding past facts are speculative
and not supported by the record. It asserted:
UPS assuredly benefitted from Dr. Knoebel' s opinion and acquiesced in the same,
since the Commission's records reflect that the claims file was eventually retired
without the payment of any impairment rating by UPS or its then surety. In 1991,
at the time Dr. Knoebel rendered his rating, it was to the advantage of UPS and its
then surety to minimize their exposure by obtaining a favorable opinion on
[Respondent's] impairment/limitations. This they did.
(2012 Decision, p. 34 ).

The Industrial Commission also asserted that Respondent's current

accident "has made it advantageous to UPS and its current surety to argue that some portion of
Claimant's impairment must predate the subject accident." (2012 Decision, p. 34). Inherent in
the Industrial Commission's assertions is the assumption that UPS believed or had knowledge in
1991 that Respondent was entitled to an impairment rating. There is no evidence, however, of an
opinion that conflicts with Dr. Knoebel's, and no evidence Respondent disputed the opinion or
was induced to accept it without challenge. There was never a determination Respondent was
entitled to impairment for his 1990 low back injury because he did not file a Complaint and the
matter was not litigated. The Industrial Commission relied on Idaho Code § 72-307 in support of
its holding that UPS should be bound by Dr. Knoebel's rating, even though its surety at the time
was different, but this statute provides that a surety is bound and subject to orders, findings,
decisions, and awards rendered against the employer for the payments of compensation, and in
this case, the Industrial Commission acknowledged that the 1990 claim was never litigated. No
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findings, decisions, or awards were ever entered. It is incumbent upon a claimant who seeks
benefits to prove causation, but here, the Industrial Commission assumed causation regarding the
1990 injury without any evidence other than UPS's payment of benefits. Its assumption about
facts known or available at an earlier time is without support and entirely erroneous.
The Industrial Commission also held it was clear that UPS was asserting a position
inconsistent with one it acquiesced in and benefitted from in 1991. This is also without support.
First, UPS's position at the 2012 hearing was about the appropriate degree of apportionment; a
position supported by Respondent's treating physician, Dr. Frizzell, and the Industrial
Commission, which found that Respondent's pre-existing low back condition met all the
elements ofISIF liability. Secondly, it cannot be said that UPS took a position in 1991 regarding
the degree of impairment because there is no medical opinion from 1991 stating that impairment
was warranted. UPS's reliance on Dr. Knoebel's opinion, along with Respondent, cannot be
construed as a position when there was not a dispute about the matter and no evidence of a
differing opinion.

There was no duty on UPS to challenge the only opinion on the matter,

particularly if Respondent agreed with it, and the Industrial Commission's implication to the
contrary is purely speculative. Its conclusion that UPS must be forever bound by Dr. Knoebel's
0% rating from 1991 is similarly erroneous.
In the Industrial Commission's 2012 Order on Reconsideration, it asserted that UPS
impliedly consented to its consideration of the quasi-estoppel issue because it did not address the
issue in its brief. This argument is flawed. See J\1ortensen v. Steivart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho
437, 443-44, 235 P.3d 387, 393-94 (2010) (concluding a party was apparently not on notice of
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the opposing party's quasi-estoppel claim, which was not expressly stated in the pleadings,
because it did not address any estoppel argument in its memorandum in support of summary
judgment). UPS did not discuss quasi-estoppel in its brief for the reasons stated above; it was
not properly pleaded by Respondent or ISIF, not noticed as an issue for hearing, and not
discussed at the hearing itself when the parties and the Commissioners addressed the issues to be
litigated.

In contrast, UPS did discuss the issue of res judicata in its brief because Respondent

requested months prior to the 2012 hearing that it be included as an issue for resolution.
Accordingly, the Industrial Commission's claim that because UPS did not address quasi-estoppel
in its brief it agreed to litigate the issue is without merit, especially when there is no evidence
showing that UPS received proper notice of the issue.
Similarly, there is no support for the proposition that it would be unconscionable for UPS
to maintain its current position regarding apportionment. Unconscionable is defined as:
So one-sided as to be oppressive and unfair (unconscionable contract). Excessive,
unreasonable, preposterous, exorbitant, unscrupulous, corrupt, monstrous,
criminal, dishonorable, scheming, unethical, amoral, perverse, unjustifiable,
inexcusable, undue, uncalled-for, shameless, overbearing, unequal, inordinate.
William P. Statsky, West's Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary 766 (Joan Torkildson ed., West
Publishing Company) (1985). Here, the Industrial Commission found that 7% of Respondent's
19% impairment rating should be assigned to his 1990 injury and that the elements of ISIF
liability were met. There is no showing it would be unconscionable for ISIF to be partially liable
for Respondent's total and permanent disability when Idaho Code § 72-332 requires it to pay
compensation in such situations.
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72-332. Payment for second mJunes from industrial special indemnity
account. (1) If an employee who has a permanent physical impairment from any
cause or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease
arising out of and in the course of his employment, and by reason of the combined
effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or
occupational disease or by reason of the aggravation and acceleration of the preexisting impairment suffers total and permanent disability, the employer and
surety shall be liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the disability
caused by the injury or occupational disease, including scheduled and
unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured employee shall be
compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the industrial
special indemnity account.
I.C. § 72-332 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Industrial Commission's application of quasiestoppel should be consistent.

It is no more unconscionable to allow UPS to advocate for

apportionment than it is for Respondent to accept $30, 780.64 in PPI benefits for his right thumb
and bilateral shoulders and now assert he "did not have any functional limitations" related to
those conditions.

(Resp. 2012 Brief, p. 20).

Accordingly, the Industrial Commission's

application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel was in error.
3.

THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERizED IN DETERMINING RESPONDENT
IS ENTITLED TO AN A WARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER IDAHO CODE§ 72804.
The issue of attorney fees was litigated at the first hearing, at which time the Industrial
Commission determined UPS did not unreasonably deny the claim. The Industrial Commission
subsequently stated in its 2011 Order Denying Stay that its 2011 Decision was final as to the
issue of whether Respondent was entitled to attorney fees. It expressly asserted the issue would
not be revisited by the Industrial Commission in future decisions, absent instruction by the Cowi
following an appeal. For the Industrial Commission to subsequently reverse its final decision on
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this matter was in error. Idaho Code § 72-804 provides:
Attorney's fees -- Punitive costs in certain cases. If the commission or any court
before whom any proceedings are brought under this law determines that the
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured
employee or dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable ground, or
that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a reasonable time after
receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay to the injured employee or his
dependents the compensation provided by law, or without reasonable grounds
discontinued payment of compensation as provided by law justly due and owing
to the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay reasonable attorney
fees in addition to the compensation provided by this law. In all such cases the
fees of attorneys employed by injured employees or their dependents shall be
fixed by the commission.
I.C. § 72-804.
Although the Industrial Commission initially awarded Respondent attorney fees at the
second hearing for UPS's refosal to pay PPI and certain medical-related expenses incurred after
the first hearing, it modified its award in its Order on Reconsideration to award attorney fees
only on the issue of PPL

The Industrial Commission believed that following the Supreme

Court's Order Denying Permissive Appeal on January 30, 2012, UPS should have paid
Respondent the portion of impairment (12%) that Dr. Frizzell opined was related to his 2009
injury. The error in this rational is that the issue of Respondent's entitlement to permanent
impairment and the extent thereof had not been determined by the Industrial Commission at that
time. The 2011 Decision found that Respondent had sustained a compensable injury, but his
entitlement to any benefits beyond those awarded in the order remained outstanding, including
permanent impairment. Accordingly, following the Supreme Court's Order Denying Permissive
Appeal, UPS promptly paid Respondent $184, 172.38 for the medical and temporary disability
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benefits awarded in the 2011 Decision, plus interest, but did not pay beyond that because all
other issues were umesolved and continued to be litigated.
Though Dr. Frizzell believed a 12% rating was appropriate in relation to Respondent's
2009 injury, it is well-established that a physician's opinion regarding the extent of impairment
is advisory only and not binding upon the Industrial Commission. E.g., Baker v. Louisiana Pac.
Corp., 123 Idaho 799, 801, 853 P.2d 544, 546 (1993). In evaluating permanent impairment, the

Industrial Commission is not limited to record or opinion evidence of a physician requested to
give a permanent impairment rating. Soto v. Simplot, 126 Idaho 536, 539-40, 887 P.2d 1043,
1046-47 (1994). In addition to a physician's rating, there is a spectrum of relevant evidence
worthy of the Industrial Commission's consideration, including evidence which impeaches a
claimant's credibility and is relevant regarding the extent of impairment, such as subjective pain
complaints. Id. at 539, 1046. The Industrial Commission could have chosen not to adopt Dr.
Frizzell's opinion in its entirety at the 2012 hearing, and without a determination Respondent
was entitled to permanent impairment, UPS had no obligation to pay it.
Moreover, despite the 2011 Decision, the burden of proof regarding entitlement to
permanent impairment remained with Respondent. Ball v. Daw Forest Products, Co., 136 Idaho
155, 158-59, 30 P.3d 933, 936-37 (2001).

A claimant has the burden of proving all facts

essential to recovery by a preponderance of the evidence.

Id. Respondent was still required to

put on evidence regarding impairment not just regarding UPS' s responsibility in relation to his
2009 injury, but for purposes of ISIF liability. See I.C. § 72-332, -422 ("Pennanent impairment
is a basic consideration in the evaluation of permanent disability, and is a contributing factor to,
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but not necessarily an indication

of~

the entire extent of permanent disability."). Therefore, it

was perfectly reasonable for UPS to wait until there was a final determination from the Industrial
Commission on the issue of permanent impairment before paying permanent impairment
benefits.
To this point, despite the Industrial Commission's finding regarding permanent
impairment, its application of the quasi-estoppel doctrine and determination UPS was liable for
100% of Respondent's total permanent disability eliminated UPS's responsibility to pay
permanent impairment benefits. The Industrial Commission's ultimate decision rendered any
PPI rating related to the subject injury moot.

This is because in cases of total permanent

disability where the employer is l 00% liable, no permanent impairment benefits are payable.
LC. § 72-402. Rather, the employer is responsible for total permanent disability benefits as of
the date of medical stability. Id. That is the case here. The Industrial Commission did not order
UPS to pay the 12% permanent impairment rating because it ordered the company to pay 100%
of total permanent disability benefits as of Respondent's date of medical stability in November
2010. Consequently, the Industrial Commission has ordered UPS to pay attorney fees on a
benefit it does not owe, and which Respondent had not proven he was entitled to when UPS
denied payment. Accordingly, the Industrial Commission's award of attorney fees should be
reversed.

Because the Industrial Commission erred in applying the positional risk and quas1estoppel doctrines to the facts of this case and awarded attorney fees in error, UPS respectively
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requests the Court reverse its 2011 Decision and find all remaining issues moot. Alternatively, if
the Court affirms the Industrial Commission's award of compensability, UPS requests its
findings regarding quasi-estoppel and attorney fees be reversed.
DATED this day 24th of April, 2013.
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